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CLASSIC LESSONS FROM A LITTLE FISH IN A PORK BARREL—
FEATURING THE NOTORIOUS STORY OF THE ENDANGERED SNAIL 
DARTER AND THE TVA’S LAST DAM 
 
Zygmunt Plater* 
 
I.  THE FISH THAT WAS A CANARY: THE SNAIL DARTER AND CONTINUING 
PUZZLES OF LAW & POLICY 
 
Canaries are small, fragile, sensitive creatures weighing no more than 20 
grams, about seven-tenths of an ounce. They have become a familiar and 
significant metaphor, however, due to the important role they played as vivid 
warning indicators of substantial threats to human welfare.1 Because canaries are 
extremely sensitive to the presence of methane and carbon monoxide—deadly but 
odorless gases that seep from deep coal deposits—miners in England and the U.S. 
carried canaries in little cages along with them as they worked in underground coal 
seams. When the canaries began to sway and slump noticeably on their perches, 
the miners could react immediately, realizing that something was terribly wrong 
for humans as well. 
The diminutive “snail darter”—the small endangered fish still remembered 
derisively as an icon of over-reaching wildlife law for its role three decades ago in 
obstructing completion of the TVA’s last water project, the Tellico Dam—likewise 
served in fact and function as a canary in a coal mine. The darter’s role as an 
indicator of large issues of human welfare and governance, however, never 
garnered the familiarity and acknowledgment achieved by the canary. The little 
fish was and is generally cloaked in a cloud of mocking dismissal,2 remembered as 
a small technicality misused by extreme environmentalists to block human 
progress. 
                                                 
* © 2012 Zygmunt Plater. Professor of Law, Boston College. I am honored and proud 
to have been able to present the second annual Wallace Stegner Lecture, and thank 
Distinguished Professor Robert Keiter and his marvelous staff for their thoughtfulness and 
support in organizing and accomplishing the 16th annual Stegner Center Symposium.  As 
an additional resource to the reader, an extensive gallery containing images of the 
endangered fish, the river, the valley, and the farmers and other citizens who carried the 
snail darter controversy through its years of legal and political maneuvers is available in the 
format of a photo-essay booklet, which was prepared for the 30-year commemoration of 
their effort. The booklet is available at: http://www.bc.edu/snaildarter. 
1 Canaries were used as indicators of human welfare hazards in underground mines as 
late as the last decades of the 20th century. See Last coal mine canary, FLICKR, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/philipdunn/3118096659 (last visited June 20, 2012) 
(showing a photograph of a miner carrying a canary); see also William H. van der Schalie 
et al., Animals as Sentinels of Human Health Hazards of Environmental Chemicals, 107 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 309 (1999). 
2 See infra text and note at 90. 
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Nevertheless small artifacts can sometimes produce large societal revelations, 
particularly when reconsidered in retrospective context through the magnifying 
lens of history. From this perspective, coming from an avowed advocate 
participant,3 this Essay presents a narrative account of the extended citizen battles 
over the TVA Tellico Dam Project. On its facts the snail darter’s surprising and 
convoluted history, in the federal courts and agencies, in the halls of Congress and 
the executive offices of the White House, and in the mechanisms of politics and 
the media, presents a useful parable—a threat to the survival of a small species in a 
large ecosystem revealing deep human concerns in a wide range of societal 
dimensions—citizen initiatives, legislatures and courts, law and science, public 
interest economics, partisan politics and legislative polarization, media and the 
formation of public opinion, ethics and cultural values, social and community 
dynamics, and more. The snail darter’s story is a prime candidate for retrospective 
revisionist analysis.4 
                                                 
3 The author, along with students and friends, served as petitioner and attorney in 
judicial proceedings from the original darter trial through the Supreme Court, and as the 
citizen group’s coordinator in the darter defenders’ extensive efforts in administrative 
agency and executive offices in Tennessee and Washington, D.C., in congressional politics, 
in media representation, and through the innovative first cabinet-level economic review in 
the so-called God Committee or God Squad. See infra note 60. This text is thus written 
from the perspective of an advocate; however, as an academic, the author is also 
constrained by a responsibility for fairness to opposing arguments. It is impossible, of 
course, to remove one’s personal reactions to a dramatic case which one has lived. On the 
objective historical record, however, most of the facts of this particular case were 
ultimately determined to be extremely one-sided. In a wide range of areas, as the 1979 God 
Committee ultimately concluded, the actual merits of the case for the dam project were 
slim to none. Seen in retrospect, the citizens’ arguments and alternative plans from the start 
were overwhelmingly more accurate and positive for the affirmative interests of the public 
and the environment. 
4 See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), aff’d 549 F.2d 1064 (6th 
Cir. 1977), rev’d 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
In addition to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court there were more than a dozen 
judicial decisions in the course of the TVA campaign to build the Tellico Dam, including 
condemnation challenges, NEPA litigation, endangered species litigation, and Indian 
religious rights cases. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. 
Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (involving condemnation challenge), aff’d, 532 F.2d 1083 
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tennessee Valley 
Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (involving NEPA litigation), aff’d, 468 F.2d 
1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1973) (involving NEPA litigation), aff’d, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). Subsequent 
to the darter litigation was Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1979) (involving Indian religious rights), aff’d, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). As noted below, the case was also subject to the first-ever 
economic review by the cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee under the 1978 
Baker-Culver Amendments, which unanimously decided in favor of the darter on economic 
grounds. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Endangered Species Committee, Hearing of Jan. 23, 
1979 (on file with the author). 
2012] LITTLE FISH CAN BECOME CANARIES 213 
Was the snail darter litigation “The Most Extreme Environmental Case 
Ever”?5 Its centerpiece, the endangered two-inch long fish, is still regularly 
invoked as a rhetorical weapon against progressive initiatives by the likes of Rush 
Limbaugh and Sean Hannity, who characterize the case as an icon of radical 
irrationality. 
As it was widely reported during the 1970s, the story consistently came down 
to a simple caricature—the snail darter, a two-inch minnow, was misused under the 
Endangered Species Act by extremist environmentalists, at the last possible 
moment, to halt completion of a gigantic $150,000,000 hydroelectric dam. In fact, 
every element of that summary was incorrect.6 The perceived reality, however, had 
an immutable force of its own, then and still now, possessing more importance 
than the facts as they existed on the record. 
In remembering and invoking the snail darter as a prime example of 
regulatory extremism, Rush Limbaugh has called the citizens who brought the case 
“homosocialists”7 but Hannity thinks “fringe lunatics” more accurate.8 Justice 
                                                 
5 Even empathic observers can see the story as extreme:  
 
On a day in early June, Bobby Kennedy Jr. stands over the body of a 
decomposing fox, killed by one of his homemade traps that had been set after 
the rabid creature had menaced his children at his home in Mount Kisco, N.Y. 
Nature is his faith, and he recounts a conversation he’d had with a Catholic 
priest on a mountain top. “I kind of challenged him with the most difficult 
episode in the history of environmental advocacy, which was the snail darter 
case. I said, ‘How did we allow this 2-inch fish with no economic significance 
to hold up a $1 billion dam project that would have provided energy and jobs to 
people? Why did we put fish before people?’”  
 
John Marks, The Return of the Kennedys, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 26, 1996), 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/960902/archive_034469_print.htm. 
6 Percina Imostoma tanasi is a small perch, not a minnow, and it can grow to a full 3 
inches. More significantly, as discussed much more fully below, the fish’s champions were 
a coalition of farmers, fishermen, and conservation-minded citizens. The fish’s 
endangerment had been raised as a cautionary issue long before the agency accelerated its 
efforts in constructing the project. The Tellico Dam was small, itself cost little more than 
$4 million, and had no electric generators. The project actually had “recreation” as its 
prime purpose and justification, with the real estate development of thousands of acres of 
condemned private farmlands as its second major purpose. As to “misuse” of the 
Endangered Species Act, readers can re-weigh that criticism at the conclusion of this 
narrative. 
7 “The militant environmentalist movement in America today is a new 
homosocialism, communism . . . They are trying to attack capitalism and corporate 
America . . . and they’re trying to say that we must preserve . . . virgin trees because the 
spotted owl and the rat kangaroo and whatever live in them, and it’s the only place they can 
live, the snail darter and whatever it is.” Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh Show, 
(Infinity radio broadcast, Dec. 7, 1993). 
8 See Hannity’s America (ABC radio broadcast December 7, 2008) (interviewing 
Ainsley Earnhardt): 
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Scalia and many others on the anti-regulatory Right use the little snail darter as a 
dismissive shorthand for misguided government rules,9 a sardonic put-down quip 
                                                                                                                            
 
SEAN HANNITY: I’m all for nuclear energy . . . . But now . . . why haven’t we 
gone further? 
AINSLEY EARHARDT: Really, the environmentalists are worried about the 
habitats. You have the snail-darter example that you saw . . . . 
HANNITY: These are fringe lunatics. We’ve got to live. 
EARHARDT: They are worried about the fish. They are worried about the 
habitat. 
HANNITY: They’re worried about porcupine, caribous—always some animal 
they are worried about. 
EARHARDT: Right. But what about us and our energy? 
HANNITY: Exactly. 
 
9 Justice Scalia, during oral argument in a recent Supreme Court case weighing costs 
of power-plant water rules, where the issue was endangered fish fry being sucked into 
power plant intakes, argued that “It seems ridiculous to . . . require [cost-benefit analysis] 
where human health is at stake, and yet to forbid it . . . when you were just talking about 
snail darters.” Oral Argument at 54:41, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 555 U.S. 941 
(2008) (No. 07–588), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008 
_07_588. 
Amongst many others who have used the little fish in recent months and years as a 
dismissive put-down of government action are Ann Coulter, Trent Lott, George Will, and 
even Stephen Colbert and Vice President Joe Biden. See for example: 
Ann Coulter talking about her 2006 book “Godless”: “[L]iberalism sees humans as 
just part of the Earth; we’re not given dominion over the Earth, as Genesis says. We’re, if 
anything, a blight on the Earth and we must give way . . . . We must make sure the snail 
darter is fine, but we should be living like the aborigines.” Kudlow & Company (CNBC 
television broadcast June 15, 2006). 
Sen. Trent Lott: “I sat in the audience and listened to the snail darter case before the 
Supreme Court. Listening to the arguments in that one case was enough for me. I left and 
never returned.” 149 CONG. REC. S3676-77 (daily ed. March 13, 2003).  
George F. Will, How Congress Trumps Darwin, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2009, at B07, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/06/AR2009 
020602743.html. 
 
[E]volution is a fact, and its mechanism is natural selection: Creatures with 
variations especially suited to their environmental situation have more 
descendants than do less well-adapted creatures . . . . [I]n 1973, Congress passed 
the Endangered Species Act . . . . Four years later, the act held up construction 
of a Tennessee dam deemed menacing to the snail-darter minnow . . . [quoting 
Ed Yoder] “The Congress of the United States, one is intrigued to learn, intends 
to stop [evolution] in its tracks.” With that accomplished, it should be child’s 
play for Congress to make the climate behave. Pick your own meaning of 
“child’s play.” 
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used to characterize a broad range of progressive initiatives as unreasoning 
extremism and rank stupidity. The little fish entered the public canon more 
generally, as well. The brouhaha over the silly darter filled the newspapers, talk 
shows, and television coverage for six years—it was one of the three most covered 
environmental stories of that decade,10 virtually always with a text or subtext of 
ludicrous disproportionality. The deprecatory public image of the case ultimately 
facilitated a congressional override that permitted final construction of the dam 
(subsequently augmented by successful transplanting efforts that have allowed the 
darter to be down-listed from “endangered” to “threatened”).11 Today, even 
political liberals regard the darter case as a vignette of far-fetched governmental 
protectionism,12 and ardent environmentalists assume the campaign to save the 
fish, no matter how ethically or ecologically appealing, stretched the limits of 
common sense rationality.13 And Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the most eminent 
living philosopher, uses the Supreme Court’s snail darter decision, which he 
contrasts to the judgmental wisdom of Hercules, as a primary example of law run 
amok.14 
                                                                                                                            
Vice President Joseph Biden: “It used to be when the construction trades and the 
building trades would support us, when we’d say, ‘green’ that meant, oh, God, the snail 
darter! We’re not going to have a building, we’re not going to build a dam.” Jennifer 
Harper, Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A2 (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/22/inside-the-beltway-913 
03173/?page=all. 
10 According to Professor Ronald Rollet, an environmental journalism specialist at the 
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources, as recounted to the author; the other 
two issues were the Love Canal toxics and the Alaska Lands Act controversies. Report 
from Professor Ronald Rollet, University of Michigan School of Natural Resources, to 
Zygmunt Plater, Boston College of Law (1980) (on file with the author).  
11 See Fish and Wildlife Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 27510-01 (July 5, 1984) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
12 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Vice President, Remarks by 
Vice President Biden Announcing Recovery Act “Retrofit Ramp-Up” Awards on Eve of 
Earth Day (Apr. 21, 2010) (commenting on federal subsidy grants for communities 
implementing efficient programs for energy conservation), available at http://www. 
filmannex.com/movie/vp-biden-announces-retrofit-ramp-up-awards/25928 (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2011). 
13 See Marks, supra note 5. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., is the Hudson Riverkeeper, an 
environmental law professor, and ardent advocate and litigator, currently on the faculty at 
Pace University Law School. 
14 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 20–30, 328–347 (1986). Dworkin, the 
author’s erstwhile conflicts professor, forcefully declares his conception of the facts and 
foolishness of the darter case. The reader may wish to re-evaluate the good professor’s 
thesis in light of the record noted herein. Dworkin is “asking how an ideal Dworkinian 
judge (Hercules) could operate in a pervasively unjust legal system . . . .” Dworkin’s 
argument alleges that legal positivists, who are committed to the view that “legal facts are 
grounded in . . . social, not moral, facts” (p.33), cannot account for “theoretical 
disagreements” in the law, i.e., disagreements “about what the grounds of law are” (p.36). 
As an example of such a debate, Dworkin cites Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, in which a 
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For many Americans today the snail darter is a story that happened before 
they were born. For most, in all likelihood it is a story that has been encountered—
by environmentalists as well as antagonists—in simplistic terms, usually as the 
object of notoriety and ridicule. It continues in today’s political rhetoric still 
ensnarled in a confused history of factual controversy and spin. 
Depending how you looked at it, the darter-dam conflict was an 
inappropriate, unbalanced, campaign of self-appointed crusaders misusing a tiny 
fish to serve their own obstructionist ends—or it’s an instructive saga of citizen 
amateurs carrying a diminutive endangered fish like a warning symbol, a canary in 
the coal mine, through multiple ascending layers of political officialdom, against 
large odds, to tell the world about an Emperor not wearing clothes. 
Clearly favoring the canary metaphor, this Essay is a revisionist analysis of 
the darter-dam story, re-scrutinizing the tumultuous six years of the darter battles. 
Like water everywhere, the snail darter’s river reflected all that touched it—
landscape, history, people, science, the structures and politics of modern 
governance. Behind the narrative of the darter-dam litigation and its political 
context lie several special puzzles for modern environmental protection initiatives. 
                                                                                                                            
divided Supreme Court enjoined the construction of a dam that would have threatened with 
extinction the noble snail darter, in violation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 . . . 
The majority and the dissent disagreed about “the legal relevance” of the “plain facts” 
about which they agreed—namely, that the Endangered Species Act was valid law, that the 
Congress had not squarely addressed the policy question raised in the case, and that they 
found the idea of stopping a nearly-completed $100 million dam construction project to 
save a relatively unimportant species of fish to be recklessly improvident, as a matter of 
policy (p.38). Nevertheless, they disagreed about whether the plain text of the statute 
should, in a case not contemplated by the legislature, be followed literally, despite the 
absurd consequences, or whether, in such a case, the text should be construed so as to avoid 
the absurdity. Such a disagreement fits neatly into Dworkin’s conception of interpretive 
legal argument—the relevant question would be which interpretation best fits with the 
existing body of case law and is morally best, i.e., most consistent with the deep moral 
principles running through our legal system. Shapiro notes, however, that legal positivists 
have not yet provided a similarly convincing account, though he begins to sketch his own 
positivistic solution to the puzzle, which suggests that disagreements about the grounds of 
law are really disagreements about the “political objectives that the current designers of the 
legal system sought to achieve” (p.45)—i.e., disagreements about social, not moral, facts. 
Joseph R. Reisert, RONALD DWORKIN, by Arthur Ripstein (ed.), L. & POL. BOOK REV., 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/ripstein0108.htm (last visited June 
24, 2012). 
See also John T. Noonan Jr., Hercules and the Snail Darter, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
1986, at 7-12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/25/books/hercules-and-the-
snail-darter.html?pagewanted=all. 
If considered, the actual facts of the darter litigation would perhaps require an 
expansion of Professor Dworkin’s philosophical focus to note that context can be critical to 
a conscientious judge’s search for justice, thereby implying that a case’s factual context, 
beyond the essential legal facts of the prima facie case, should be part of the presentation of 
every action at law. This is a proposition that Dworkin doesn’t address and probably would 
eloquently resist. 
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Is it unethical or hypocritical for citizen opponents to use federal law to 
obstruct a public works project in a way the bill’s majority in Congress clearly 
never intended, hanging the lawsuit on a statutory technicality? Were my students 
and I blatant hypocrites to use an endangered fish beyond its intended statutory 
context in order to save a river and 300 family farms from the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s last dam? Upon first hearing about the darter-dam lawsuit a natural and 
almost-universal first reaction was, and is, a skeptical sense that the law protecting 
wildlife was being misused. An inherent hint of illegitimacy, coupled with the 
force of a lobbying campaign by anti-regulatory interests, hung like a troublesome 
cloud over the citizens’ efforts throughout the narrative. As a scowling Chief 
Justice Burger sneered from the bench, “I’m sure that they just don’t want this 
project! . . . . When the snail darter was discovered [it] became a handy handle to 
hold onto!”15  
To what extent can endangered species usefully serve a functional role as 
indicators of broader civic concerns—as canaries—in our modern framework of 
laws and governance? National and domestic policies for the protection of 
endangered wildlife are based in part upon philosophical and aesthetic human 
concerns, but also (and perhaps more forcefully in terms of legislative politics) 
upon utilitarian notions of perceived human benefits.  
The chemistry or neurology of embattled rare species may someday “provide 
a cure for cancer.” The active warning function provided by the threatened 
existence of endangered species in their natural habitat settings serves a more 
systemically instrumental utilitarianism. Canaries can reveal information critical to 
human welfare that otherwise would not be recognized—neither smelled, seen, 
heard, nor thought. And once a canary’s warning has been sounded, what systemic 
obstacles may prevent the functional message from being heard and reacted to? If 
inherent institutional and psychological blocks trigger resistance and avoidance of 
societally important information, the short- and long-term consequences to 
sustainability and public welfare can indeed be potentially troubling in the 
complex, hectic, challenged structures and currents of modern democratic 
governance. 
Beyond Chief Justice Burger’s acerbic side-comment, none of these puzzles 
is evidenced within the Supreme Court’s snail darter decision. As a legal artifact, 
law professors have consistently ranked the case as one of the Court’s two most 
significant environmental protection decisions.16 In narrowest terms, however, the 
                                                 
15 Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 51–52, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153 (1978) (on file with the author) [hereinafter TVA Oral Argument]. 
16 In an online poll of environmental law professors from across the country in 2001 
seeking a consensus on the ten most important court cases in the history of environmental 
law, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill received the highest number of votes, almost twice as 
many as the two cases that placed second (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976)). See Posting of James Salzman, salzman@wcl.american.edu, to 
envlawprofs@darkwing.uoregon.edu (Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with author). In 2009 the 
same poll still had Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill in the law professors’ top two (the other 
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majority opinion in TVA v. Hill is essentially just a clarification of a point of 
standard equity law: do judges have the ability to override statutory provisions 
based on their own view of the public’s interest, or is that ultimately the job of the 
other branches? TVA v. Hill’s more significant precedent may be in terms of policy 
and politics: A motley little group of very unpowerful, unwealthy citizens carrying 
their factual arguments up through all three branches of government, through a 
gauntlet of media and political ridicule, thereby raising some intriguing questions. 
 
II. THE DARTER, THE LITTLE TENNESSEE RIVER,  
AND THE TVA TELLICO DAM PROJECT 
 
The context of the snail darter-Tellico Dam conflict is complex and extends 
out over two decades of the twentieth century. Condensed to its most essential 
elements it was: 
(1)  a project ultimately shown to be a major destructive mistake, set in 
motion by a government agency and its political allies, and 
(2)  only because of the not-exactly-coincidental existence of an endangered 
species, and 20 years of effort by citizens motivated to leverage the law, 
was the ongoing mistake eventually acknowledged within the official 
wheels of our modern industrial democracy, with mixed results.  
A bit of background history: As late as 1936, the small species of perch that 
would come to be known as the snail darter probably existed throughout the 
Tennessee River system in scattered populations living and spawning on broad 
shallow river shoals.17 The Big Tennessee River, the Little Tennessee, and their 
tributaries rose in the Great Smoky Mountain region where the eastern edge of 
Tennessee meets North Carolina and Georgia, and flowed in multiple threads 
westward across Tennessee and parts of Kentucky, to the Mississippi. The wild 
game and rich soils in the fertile bottomlands around the Little Tennessee 
supported continuous layers of human settlement for longer than any other place in 
the continental United States.18 When the Cherokee confederation came together 
West of the Great Smoky Mountains in the early 1500s, it chose the Little 
Tennessee River as its spiritual and governing center, with the capital village of 
Chota as its Jerusalem and city of refuge. When in the 1830s Andrew Jackson and 
Martin van Buren drove the Cherokees away to Oklahoma or into hidden valleys in 
the mountains, white settler families took their lands. Some of the settlers’ 
descendants still farmed those rich dark soils a century-and-a-half later, living in 
                                                                                                                            
was Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). See James Salzman & 
J.B. Ruhl, Who’s Number One?, 26 ENVTL. FORUM 36, 39 (November/December 2009). 
The “hypocrisy” issue raised in the Chief Justice’s comment at oral argument was nowhere 
reflected in the text of his majority opinion. 
17 See WAYNE C. STARNES, THE ECOLOGY AND LIFE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED 
SNAIL DARTER, PERCINA TANASI (1977). 
18 The work done in the Little Tennessee River Valley by Professors Chapman and 
Schroedl is detailed in JEFFERSON CHAPMAN, TELLICO ARCHAEOLOGY: TWELVE 
THOUSAND YEARS OF NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY (1994). 
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rugged little communities, often turning up arrowheads in their fields when they 
plowed each spring.19 
In 1933, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration’s New Deal created the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal wholly-owned corporation 
comprising parts of seven Southeastern states,20 with a mandate to bring 
progressive health, planning, and economic initiatives to this “backward” region. 
Two major areas for the commitment of federal dollars were agriculture (fertilizer 
operations), and building new resources for the generation of electricity. 
Emphasizing the latter, in 1936 the agency compiled a list of 69 potential dam sites 
and commenced building them. By 1960 it had built more than four dozen dams, 
eliminating linear 2500 miles of flowing riverways and giving Tennessee more 
slack water shoreline than all the Great Lakes combined.21 
By the early 1960s, however, virtually all of the remaining listed river sites 
were too marginal to be justified as hydro-electric projects. TVA was evolving 
from its traditional progressive image into nothing more than the region’s largest 
utility company. Its political power exceeded that of the state government’s.22 
                                                 
19 Personal communication from David Scates, 1975. Arrowheads are particularly 
exposed after a rain on plowed or harrowed fields. 
20 TVA’s jurisdiction touches all or part of Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. 
21 The total shoreline of TVA reservoirs within Tennessee is now approximately 
10,000 miles in summer months, compared to the Great Lakes’ 10,500 miles. Telephone 
interview with a member of the reference staff, TVA Public Information Office (Sept. 3, 
1982); GRADY WAYNE, THE GREAT LAKES (2007). 
22 For 1971 correspondence where TVA’s Chairman Wagner, rejected Gov. Winfield 
Dunn’s request that the dam project be terminated, see WILLIAM BRUCE WHEELER AND 
MICHAEL J. MCDONALD, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM, 1936–1979: A BUREAUCRATIC 
CRISIS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 142–43 (1986), and KENNETH M. MURCHISON, THE 
SNAIL DARTER CASE: TVA VERSUS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 56 (2007). Governor 
Winfield Dunn, responding to the farmers’ arguments, sent a letter to Chairman Wagner on 
behalf of the State of Tennessee officially requesting TVA to scrap the Tellico project: 
 
The best interests of the state would best be served if TVA were to discontinue 
plans to impound the Little Tennessee River . . . . Impoundment . . . would 
reduce, rather than expand, recreational opportunities in Tennessee . . . . The 
lands which would be inundated by the Tellico Lake contain numerous sites of 
historical and archaeological interest, and the proposed reservoir would bury a 
great acreage of . . . cropland, pasturage, and woodland . . . . The Little 
Tennessee could best serve . . . as the focal point for a scenic river recreational 
gateway to the national [park] beyond . . . . Much of . . . the public monies 
already invested . . . can be reclaimed or turned to other uses. The Little 
Tennessee as it now exists is a waterway too valuable for the State of Tennessee 
to sacrifice. 
 
Chairman Wagner sent a condescending reply letter to the Governor rejecting the state’s 
request: 
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Steam plants burning strip-mined coal provided 90% of its total generation 
capacity.23 Its internal inertial momentum, however, continued to push for building 
all dams on the list. Although external critics vigorously argued that those 
marginal dam sites were more valuable as flowing rivers and agricultural 
communities,24 there was no practicable way to halt the agency’s “iron triangle” 
drive to continue building dams.25 By the mid-1970s there were only two 
unfinished dams remaining,26 and TVA was proceeding on construction of both of 
them. 
TVA’s final dam was the Tellico Dam, slated to eliminate what was perhaps 
the richest, most valuable, cultural, ecological, historical, and economic valley 
resource in the region, by impounding the Little Tennessee’s last 33 miles flowing 
through gently-rolling farmland west of the Smoky Mountains. The Little 
Tennessee in those miles was a river of startling clarity and richness that had been 
flowing for 200 million years, containing the very oldest sites of 10,000 years of 
continuous human habitation, a centuries-old farm community, more than 15,000 
acres of the nation’s best agricultural soils, the finest trout-fishing water east of 
Montana, and a dozen Cherokee historical sites including Chota, Toskegee (where 
the Cherokees’ great leader, Sequoyah, was born), and Tennessee Town, the site 
that gave its name to the river and the state. It was the region’s last remaining 
stretch of big, high-quality river for flowing water recreation. 
Most observers then and now assumed the TVA dam was being built to 
provide hydro-power. The facts are far more bemusing. Unable to justify the 
Tellico Dam for any of the usual dam benefits—hydro, flood control, water 
                                                                                                                            
Your letter does not appear to raise any new or different factors from those 
which were fully considered by both TVA and the Congress before construction 
of the Tellico project was commenced . . . . The course of action you have 
proposed would sacrifice the much broader benefits which can be realized 
through comprehensive development as provided by the Tellico project. 
 
Wagner then lectured the Governor for 34 paragraphs about the project’s benefits in the 
same terms he had long been touting—“a full range” of industrial, recreational, and urban 
residential development benefits—and noted the political insignificance of the river’s 
defenders. 
23 See WILLIAM CHANDLER, THE MYTH OF TVA: CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE TENNESSEE VALLEY, 1933–1983 (1984). Mr. Chandler developed a statistical 
analysis demonstrating that non-TVA counties adjacent to counties under the development 
aegis of TVA generally fared as well as or better than the TVA counties. 
24 Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning, a citizens group based in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, was a leading critic of the “bureaucratic irrationality” that kept pushing to build 
dams which their analyses showed were more destructive than beneficial.  
25 “Iron triangles” are the classic political science rubric for the powerful insider 
alliances that form and dominate within government around economic initiatives.  
26 The Columbia Dam on the Duck River in the low rolling countryside near 
Madisonville, Tennessee and the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee southeast of 
Knoxville, 30 miles West of the Great Smoky Mountains. 
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supply—27starting in 1959, despite local opposition, the TVA chairman had urged 
his staff to drum up a new suite of economic justifications to support it.28 
 
Any power or flood control benefit would be insignificant. . . . [But] it 
may only depend on how ingenious and resourceful we can be in finding 
a basis for evaluating [the] project’s usefulness. . . . Come . . . and bring 
all the optimism you have.29 
 
Two primary justifications were ultimately formulated by the TVA staff for 
their last dam—enhanced recreation benefits, and shoreland development of a 
hypothesized Model City to be built by the Boeing Corporation on condemned 
farmland and to be named Timberlake after an early British visitor to the valley.30 
                                                 
27 Under the existing federal law and Senate Document 97, S. DOC. NO. 97, 87TH 
CONG., 2d SESS. (1964), every federal agency, when spending tax payer dollars, had to 
have a theoretically profitable benefit-cost ratio—for every taxpayer dollar spent, the 
proposed project has to be able to claim to earn at least $1.01 over 100 years. Beyond 
hyperbolic benefit projections, agency planners were helped in projecting their positive 
ratios by the fact that they could treat the cost of taxpayer dollars as interest-free, or nearly 
so. 
28 For a history of the internal agency deliberations, see WHEELER & MCDONALD, 
supra note 22; STEPHEN J. RECHICHAR & MICHAEL R. FITZGERALD, THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION: TVA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION AND 
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL REGULATION (1983). These two books are excellent sources of 
background data on the history and merits of the controversy and TVA’s adamancy in 
pushing the dam in the face of the law and critical analysis on the merits. The TVA can 
self-authorize projects if they fit its charter, and Wagner was seizing upon Section 22 of the 
TVA Act which authorizes “the proper use, conservation, and development of the natural 
resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and of such adjoining territory as may be 
related to or materially affected by the development consequent to this chapter . . .” TVA 
Act § 22, 16 U.S.C. § 831u (1994). 
29 Interview of Aubrey Wagner, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, KNOXVILLE 
J. (Sept. 23, 1964). Wagner had stated in September 1961 (when he was Director and 
shortly thereafter Chairman of the TVA) that the remaining unbuilt dams—those on the 
larger tributaries like Tellico—were not economically feasible. Wagner stated, “[The] 
benefits [of these remaining, unbuilt dams] are not nearly great enough alone to justify the 
total cost of the projects.” Public Works Appropriations, 1962: Hearings on H.R. 9076 
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 
(1961) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 9076]. Later, during the same hearing, Wagner stated 
that all dams that one could “justify” had been built, and that the other dam project 
proposals remaining on the original list “fall far short” of being justifiable under the TVA 
Act. Id. at 81. See also WHEELER & MCDONALD, supra note 22. 
30 The official Benefit-Cost ration as of the 1972 environmental impact statement: 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (later downgraded): 
DIRECT ANNUAL BENEFITS: 
Recreation                       $1,440,000 
Shoreline development       $714,000 
Flood control        $505,000 
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Neither of these claims was a standard justification for a federal dam project. Both 
were vociferously challenged by the farmers who would lose their lands and the 
boaters and fishermen who cherished the extraordinary recreational values of this 
last high-quality flowing river resource. 
From the start the farmers and their fishermen and conservationist allies 
followed a classic environmental protection strategy in challenging the project they 
opposed, putting together a targeted analysis of benefits, costs, and alternatives. 
They worked to show the benefits claimed for the project were extensively 
exaggerated, the true costs were being substantially minimized, and feasible 
alternatives that would far better serve the public interest were being 
systematically ignored. 
Citizen research showed the Tellico Dam’s claimed benefits based on 
recreation and land development, the project’s primary justifications, were not 
credible.31 The project’s costs in terms of loss of agricultural production, flowing 
river recreational benefits, historical and cultural resources, not to mention the 
value of a stable agricultural community, were substantial but virtually ignored in 
the agency’s EIS.32 Alternative development designs for the river and its valley 
                                                                                                                            
Navigation          $400,000 
Power          $400,000 
Fish & wildlife        $220,000 
Water supply          $70,000 
Redevelopment                 $15,000 
Total Direct Annual Benefits:  $3,760,000 
DIRECT ANNUAL COSTS: 
Interest and amortization  $2,045,000 
Operation & maintenance     $205,000  
Total Annual Costs:   $2,250,000  
Benefit-Cost Ratio (later downgraded): 1.7: 1 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTH., TELLICO DAM PROJECT EIS I-1-49 (1972) (a copy is on file 
with the author). 
In subsequent national economic reviews by the US Government Accountability 
Office and the God Committee, all these numbers were determined to be substantially 
inaccurate. TVA had admitted that the “power” benefit was “insignificant” and could not 
justify the project; it was based on diverting water through a small canal into an adjacent 
reservoir that had generators (the Tellico Dam was not big enough to justify generators). 
“Navigation” benefits were based on hypothetical barge traffic that was always unlikely 
and never materialized. 
31 See KEITH E. PHILLIPS, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY’S TELLICO PROJECT: 
A REAPPRAISAL (1971) (research analysis prepared for a citizen group by Professor Phillips 
and his graduate students at the University of Tennessee) [reprinted with extensive 
rebuttals as Volume III of the TVA EIS: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, TELLICO PROJECT VOL. III]. 
32 See, e.g., TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTH., ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, TELLICO 
PROJECT I-1-6-7(1972) (a page and a half of text denigrating the recreational fishing 
resource). See also id. at I-1-31 (17 lines devoted to agriculture, a number of them 
denigrating the land’s importance relative to the project’s claimed benefits); Id. at I-1-35-
38 (three pages recounting history and suggesting that a sufficient amount of historical 
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were extraordinarily beneficial at a fraction of the dam project’s cost. Beyond 
continued agriculture and a feasible industrial park at a major river crossing, in 
particular the attractive alternatives included creation of a tourist route carrying 
travelers from the two neighboring Interstate highways on a scenic road through 
eleven colonial and Cherokee sites in the riverside farmlands, and thence into the 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park.33 
Years later most of the citizens’ arguments were retrospectively determined to 
have been accurate, and all of the TVA cost-benefit calculations to be unfounded.34 
As with citizen objections raised against prior marginal dam projects, however, in 
the years the Tellico project got underway federal agencies had no need to respond 
to citizen criticisms. For the greater part of the twentieth century there was no 
meaningful legal forum for citizens to raise effective arguments against politically 
potent pork barrel projects.35 
Most Americans who heard about the Tellico Dam saga over two decades 
never realized that a major part of the project benefits TVA claimed to justify the 
dam was based on the involuntary eminent domain taking of 60 square miles of 
private lands36—more than 300 family farms and homes—with most of the land 
condemned not for the dam’s reservoir but for development and resale by a private 
                                                                                                                            
value would survive reservoir impoundment). The EIS as a whole contains more than 150 
pages, predominantly asserting the economic virtues of a reservoir-based project. See also 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTH., ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, TIMBERLAKE NEW 
COMMUNITY (1976). 
33 See map, “River-Based Alternative Development,” in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, 
SETTING IT STRAIGHT: A THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY GATHERING IN MEMORY OF THE LITTLE 
TENNESSEE RIVER AND ITS VALLEY 10 (2010), available at http://lawdigitalcommons. 
bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1280&context=lsfp (last visited May 15, 2012). A 
similar map may be found appended to the citizens’ Supreme Court brief at Plater et al., 
Brief for Appellees, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, No. 76-1701, U.S. Sup. Ct., filed Mar. 
1, 1978, at 63. 
34 See God Committee analysis, infra note 60. 
35 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1973), aff’d, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 
346 (8th Cir. 1972); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 
1971), aff’d, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); United States 
v. W. Virginia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941); 
Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973); Envtl. Def. Fund v. 
Corps of Eng’rs, 348 F. Supp. 916, 924 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. 
Supp. 517 (N.D. Ala. 1973). 
36 The other major benefit claim, “recreation,” incorporated major logical flaws only 
later acknowledged in the 1979 God Committee analysis. See infra note 60. Several TVA 
economists tried to object internally that it was inappropriate for them to ignore the 
exceptional existing flowing-river recreation (which could be trebled if minimally 
managed) and tourism potentials for the river, and that it was wrong to insert recreation 
diverted from the surrounding 24 existing recreational reservoirs into Tellico Dam’s “net 
regional benefit” calculation. Faced with threats from leadership, the critical TVA 
economists went silent or left the agency, and the composite calculations remained. See 
RECHICHAR & FITZGERALD, supra note 28. 
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Fortune 500 company, the Boeing Corporation from Seattle.37 Most of the 
condemned farms in the 60-square mile project area had little or no acreage taken 
for the proposed reservoir, sometimes only 2 acres out of 100; most of the 
condemned private acreage was non-reservoir land being taken by the federal 
agency for resale.38 
The hypothesized model city development was thus particularly infuriating 
for local farmers and other citizens.39 Athelstan Spilhaus, a noted futurist, had 
prepared an experimental design for a city in Minnesota that never proved 
practicable. Harking back to the agency’s role in the Great Depression, TVA 
planners hypothesized that a model industrial city of 50,000 people should be built 
on the banks of a Tellico Reservoir—though no clear reason indicated why such a 
city would need a dam, nor why industrial development would or should be 
attracted to the edge of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.40 Even after 
Boeing abandoned the project on economic grounds the TVA leadership asserted 
that a model city would generate up to 26,000 jobs and large economic gains, and 
those numbers continued to provide the basis for the dam’s “shoreland benefits.” 
Despite the pleas of farmers traveling to Washington D.C., TVA’s justifications for 
the dam were uncritically approved by the appropriations committees that 
                                                 
37 An acreage overview of the Tellico Project: 38,000 total project acres; previous 
existing river acreage, 1,841 acres; reservoir area, 16,500 acres; lands condemned for 
reservoir, 14,659 acres; lands condemned, or bought under threat of condemnation, for 
resale and real estate development, 23,341 acres [approximately 62%]. 
The Boeing Corporation initially had been interested in developing a new town, 
Timberlake, to diversify its airframe business which was flagging after the federal 
government cancelled the U.S. supersonic transport (SST) project. 
38 Examples include properties owned by the Davis, Ritchey, and Moser families. 
39 The recreational benefit claims were likewise undercut by economic logic. Several 
TVA economists objected that it was inappropriate to ignore the exceptional existing 
flowing-river recreation (which could be trebled if minimally managed) and tourism 
potentials for the river, and that it was wrong to count recreation diverted from the 
surrounding 24 existing reservoirs as a net regional benefit. Faced with threats from 
leadership the critical TVA economists went silent or left the agency. See RECHICHAR & 
FITZGERALD, supra note 28. 
40 The “Foster Hypothesis” attempting to establish a rationale was drafted by the late 
Michael Foster, TVA’s Director of the Division of Navigation Development and Economic 
Studies. It asserted based on personal hypothesis that a combination of water, rail, and 
highway transport routes would generate jobs and industrial development wherever such 
elements occurred together. See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTH., TIMBERLAKE NEW 
COMMUNITY (1974) (draft environmental impact statement). Proceeding from this 
hypothesis, the TVA defended its dry land condemnations by predicting that large 
industries were likely to come to Timberlake that would need large, undivided tracts, which 
the TVA wanted to be certain would be available when needed for industrial development. 
See Hearings on H.R. 9076, supra note 29, at 22 (testimony of Aubrey Wagner, Chairman, 
TVA). 
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distribute taxpayer dollars to pork barrel projects in seemingly every congressional 
district in the nation.41 
In the 1960s, however, the legal topography of the United States began a 
remarkable change. Galvanized by the civil rights and consumer protection 
movements, by gradually swelling opposition to the Vietnam War, and by the 
raucous anti-establishment “Woodstock” populism of the Sixties, the legal system 
suddenly opened up to broader, more active public interest citizen participation.42 
Expansive applications of traditional tort law, and a dramatic expansion of citizen 
standing in court actions based on public law, opened the legal system to a wide 
                                                 
41 In the U.S. Congress statutes are promulgated and subsequently subjected to 
occasional oversight in the subject matter committees like the Committee on Commerce, or 
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, usually via subordinate process in 
relevant subcommittees. In the realm of public works projects they are the vehicles by 
which new projects and programs are “authorized.” (TVA actually is an exception, and 
self-authorizes some of its own projects). The Appropriations Committees in both 
chambers have a more restricted but ultimately more politically potent role; no money can 
be spent for authorized statutory, or administrative, programs and projects if they are not 
given annual appropriations by the appropriations committees. The appropriations 
ccommittees thus, unlike the substantive committees, meet every year on every ongoing 
project and program doling or withholding money. The political power inherent in this 
“pork” function is so great that members of the committees are generally prohibited from 
sitting on any other committee, and rules exist in both chambers prohibiting substantive 
provisions being attached to the multi-billion dollar, virtually un-vetoable, appropriations 
bills. See, e.g., Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XXI, cl. 2, H.R. Doc. No. 277, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 564 (1985); Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XVI, cl. 4, S. Doc. 
No. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1984). House Rule XXI, cl. 2 sets formal requirements 
for appropriations bills, including the clause, “No amendment to a general appropriation 
bill shall be in order if changing existing law.” Senate Rule XVI is to similar effect. 
42 See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). The breakthrough decision on legal standing for 
citizens in the environmental area was the Storm King Mountain case on the Hudson River. 
Scenic Hudson Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965) (holding 
that a statute may create new interests and rights, thus giving standing). In the area of 
consumer and civil rights a little-recognized milestone was Judge (later Chief Justice) 
Warren Burger’s decision in Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), appeal after remand, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See 
generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A 
Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994). 
Broad reactions in the American public against official status quos in the 1960s arose 
from a number of vivid exposures to civic dysfunctions. Television revealed horrific scenes 
of state officials loosing dogs and water cannons on citizens protesting segregation, even 
children, while federal officials did nothing. Ralph Nader’s work highlighted a wide range 
of unacknowledged injuries caused by everyday consumer products. Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring chronicled a pervasive thoughtlessness in chemical usage that revealed human 
society’s interconnection with natural ecosystems and the dangers lurking in failures to 
make production decisions holistically. The Vietnam draft brought the dubious realities of 
our bloody intervention in Indochina politics into the breast of families across the nation. 
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spectrum of participants.43 In systemic terms the United States transitioned away 
from a “di-polar” system of societal governance, where industry and economic 
powers are counterbalanced by public agencies, toward a more multi-centric, 
inclusive, pluralistic process of governance.44 
Beginning in 1970, a parade of several dozen major environmental protection 
statutes, often echoed by state corollaries, marched into the law books.45 Most of 
these statutes explicitly granted citizens standing to enforce them when the official 
agencies failed to do so.46 With the help of citizen enforcement in the courts, these 
statutes began to create a credible mandatory structure of protections against 
environmental excesses. 
Down in Tennessee, the farmers and their allies immediately seized upon 
NEPA to challenge the Tellico Dam, and won an injunction asserting that TVA 
                                                 
43 See generally ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, 
LAW & SOCIETY 241–52 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY]. 
44 For a bit more on the “di-polar-to-multicentric” rubric, noting how the “official” di-
polar players all too often gravitate too closely toward one another, see Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico . . . and the Hazards of 
“Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 389, 393–95 (2011). 
45 In the early 1970s, Congress passed and President Richard Nixon signed an 
unprecedented volume of statutes—the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Fish 
and Wildlife Coordination Act, the Noise Control Act of 1972, the Clean Water Act of 
1972, the Natural and Scenic Rivers Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and at least 
two dozen more. There were more than 30 significant environmental statutes passed in the 
three years after the National Environmental Policy Act. In terms of legislative volume, 
only President Carter’s years come close, with 20 legislative acts in an equivalent span, 
many of which merely amended and fine-tuned prior acts. These modern statutory systems 
addressed ecological and economic values and problems that had not been adequately 
acknowledged or accounted for in previous public and private law. 
46 See Toxic Substances Control Act §§19(d), 20(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§2618(d), 2619; 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 §11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. §1540(g)(4); Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §1270(d); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act §117(c), 30 U.S.C. §1427(c); Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 §505), 33 U.S.C. §1365(d); Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §1415(g)(4); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 
U.S.C. §1515(d); Safe Drinking Water Act §1449(d), 42 U.S.C. §300j-8(d); Noise Control 
Act of 1972 §12(d), 42 U.S.C. §4911(d); Energy Sources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§5851(e)(2); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §6305(d); Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §6972(e); Clean Air Act §304, 42 U.S.C. §§7604, 7607(f); 
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C. §8435(d); Ocean Thermal Energy 
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §9124(d); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§1349(a)(5). The Marine Mammal Protection Act, however, lacks such a provision. 
Significantly, most of these grants of enforcement standing also provide for certain 
litigation fee awards if appropriate, e.g., “The court, in issuing any final order in any suit 
brought pursuant to [this Act] may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney 
and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is 
appropriate.” ESA §11(g), 42 U.S.C. §1540(g)(4). 
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could not proceed with the dam without a valid environmental impact statement 
(EIS).47 When the agency ultimately produced an EIS sufficiently detailing the 
negative effects of the dam, however, the federal courts allowed it to proceed.48 
NEPA is a procedural statute, with no substantive environmental mandates. When 
the Tellico injunction was dissolved, most of the 300 farmers and other landowners 
in the project area gave up hope the dam project could be stopped. 
In October 1974, a year after the passage of the federal Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, as TVA was gearing up to finish the dam after the NEPA injunction’s 
16-month stay, one of my students, Hiram “Hank” Hill, was looking for an 
environmental law term paper topic. He had heard about the discovery of the little 
darter over beers with some ichthyology graduate students, and asked did I think it 
might be a sufficient topic for a 10-page research paper? Yes, I thought it might! In 
a very short time both of us were meeting with the farmers still resisting the dam. 
At a Saturday night potluck meeting at historic old Fort Loudon, then still standing 
on the banks of the Little Tennessee River, Asa McCall, a grizzled old farmer who 
had been holding off the TVA condemnation marshals for years through grit and 
perseverance, took off his hat, scratched his head, and said, “I’ve never before 
heard of this little fish, but I say if it can save our farms we have to give it a try.” 
He passed his hat around, and the $29 kicked in by the little group that evening 
was the start of the snail darter litigation campaign. 
The ESA’s Section 7 as it stood in 1974 was short, sweet, and virtually 
unknown, although that soon changed.49 During the darter litigation, the statutory 
provision remained deceptively simple. It had only 128 words total, but if one 
carefully parsed the paragraph, a mere 27 words hidden within it could be read to 
create two new and drastic causes of action with substantive, not procedural, 
mandates— 
 
ESA§7. (16 USC §1536) INTERAGENCY COOPERATION. The 
Secretary [of Interior] shall review other programs administered by him 
and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. 
                                                 
47 Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), 
aff’d, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972), stay denied, 414 U.S. 1036 (1973). 
48 Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Tenn. 
1973), aff’d, 492 F.2d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 1974). The text of the EIS emphasized the 
project’s claimed benefits and minimized its negatives and alternatives. The citizens’ 
assertion of the EIS’ inadequacy, as so often in NEPA procedural litigation, lost to the 
courts’ deference to agency discretion. 
49 As we prepared the darter litigation, there were two other cases proceeding under 
ESA § 7: a suit to block an interstate highway interchange on habitat of sandhill cranes 
(Grus canadensis), Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), and a 
dam case in the Midwest eventually dismissed for failure to prove harm to endangered 
Indiana bats (Myotis sodalis). Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). As 
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill moved through the courts, it was joined by Patrick 
Parenteau’s suit against the Greyrocks Dam based on harm to whooping cranes (Grus 
americanus). Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (D. Neb. 1978). 
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All other federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of 
endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 
1533 of this title and by taking such action necessary to ensure that 
actions authorized, funded, or carried out50 by such agencies [1] do not 
jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species or 
threatened species or [2] result in the destruction or modification of 
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after 
consultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be critical.51 
 
The paragraph is clearly not a paragon of legislative style, and legislators who 
voted for it in large majorities can be forgiven for not realizing that it contained 
actionable provisions.52 But note that when you parse the italicized words, the 
paragraph produces two statutory causes of action defining violations for which the 
remedies of the ESA can be invoked: [1] jeopardizing a species’ continued 
existence, and [2] destroying or modifying critical habitat.53 After getting the darter 
listed on the official endangered species list, in a story told elsewhere,54 the 
citizens filed suit, took the case up through the courts, and in the Supreme Court 
ultimately won the 6-3 decision declaring that TVA had to obey the law.55 
                                                 
50 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C §§ 1351-1544 (1973) (emphasis added). 
What federal actions does that not cover? 
51 Id. § 1536 (emphasis added).  
52 Id. As the legislative history makes clear, several legislators well knew what 
Section 7’s text mandated but, while placing significant clarifications into the committee 
records, the active potential for the section was not widely advertised. See Statement of 
Representative John Dingell, 119 Cong. Rec. 42913 (1973): “It is a pity that we must wait 
until a species is faced with extinction . . . but at least when and if that unfortunate stage is 
reached, the agencies of government can no longer plead that they can do nothing about it. 
They can, and they must. The law is clear.” In hearings on the ESA bill held by Senator 
Marlow Cook of Kentucky, Administration witnesses testified to the senators present that 
the ESA “for the first time would prohibit another federal agency from taking action which 
does jeopardize . . . endangered species.” U.S. Senate, Hearings on the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 Before the Subcommittee on the Environment of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Session 7, 68 (1973). 
53 Id. Two further possibilities that we chose not to litigate at that early stage were an 
affirmative requirement for “conservation of endangered species,” and the procedural 
requirement for “consultation,” a process that had not been subject to administrative 
definition at that point in time. For tactical reasons, the first two causes of action were 
deemed more feasible to litigate. 
54 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law 
Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 805 (1986) [hereinafter Wake 
of the Snail Darter]. 
55 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). “[I]n our constitutional 
system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt 
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Several vivid “environmental” moments in the Supreme Court oral arguments 
deserve note. 
 
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL [holding aloft a vial of formaldehyde 
containing a dead snail darter]: “. . . I have in my hand a darter, a snail 
darter, Exhibit No. 7 in the case when it was filed. And we brought that 
with us so you could see it. It’s three inches. It is supposed to be a full 
grown snail darter, about three inches in length.” 
JUSTICE BRENNAN: “Is it alive?”  
[Laughter] 
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: “I’ve been wondering what it’s in, if it is. 
It seems to move around. I’ve been puzzled over that.”  
[More laughter] 
 
The deprecatory humor of that interchange was somewhat shifted later in the 
session: 
 
JUSTICE POWELL: “. . . [W]hat purpose is served, if any, by these 
little darters? Are they used for food? . . . Are they suitable for bait?” 
COUNSEL: “No, Your Honor . . . . But ultimately there’s a utilitarian 
purpose that is served precisely by the snail darter . . . . [I]t is highly 
sensitive to clean, clear, cool flowing river water. And after 68 dams 
through the TVA river system—68 of them, one after the other—the 
range of the snail darter has apparently been destroyed, one by one, until 
this last 33 river miles is the last place on Earth where the species, and 
human beings as well, have the quality of the habitat . . . .  
JUSTICE POWELL: “So that’s the last place it’s been discovered, I take 
it?” 
COUNSEL: “Your Honor, TVA has looked everywhere for snail 
darters.” [Laughter] . . . It’s a highly specialized fish . . . an indicator of 
water quality. Instead of a dead one, I’ve left with the clerk several 
prints, which were Exhibit No. 12 at trial, which show the species in its 
natural habitat along the bottom of the river . . . .”56 
 
Surprisingly, at this moment the Clerk of the Supreme Court stood up and edged 
along behind the seated Justices, handing each a copy of the colorful exhibit 
lithograph, showing a pair of darters and the crystal clear beauty of the river 
coursing over a gravel shoal, far more meaningful than the dead fish in the vial. 
Citizens should never forget the value of graphics in conveying their arguments, 
and in this case the natural habitat and brown eyes of the cute little fish pictured in 
                                                                                                                            
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with ‘common sense and the 
public weal.’ Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”  
56 TVA Oral Argument, supra note 15. The Justice’s food/bait question was separated 
by several interjections. 
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the exhibit print might have won over at least one vote.57 The Supreme Court 
ultimately upheld the darter over the dam by a vote of 6 to 3, with Chief Justice 
Burger writing the majority opinion.58 
The Supreme Court victory was not the end of the matter, however. As the 
citizens themselves had argued, an injunction from the Court would and should be 
the catalyst for “a remand to legislature,”59 forcing Congress to do what the 
farmers had so long hoped for, an objective analysis of the true merits of the pork 
barrel dam versus the rich resources of the river and its valley. Congress soon 
began to craft and pass elaborate amendment provisions for ESA §7. The most 
significant amendment to Section 7 was the 1978 addition of an exemption process 
committed to a newly-created “Endangered Species Committee”—less reverently 
known as the God Committee or God Squad in recognition of the new entity’s 
power to authorize extinctions if its Cabinet-level members decided that a balance 
                                                 
57 Id. Perhaps the most significant “non-ecological” moment in the oral argument was 
an exchange regarding a court’s role in equitable balancing. In its essence the Tennessee 
Valley Auth. v. Hill decision was not an “environmental” decision, but rather an equity or 
separation of powers case: how should the competing statutory interests be balanced, and 
by whom—Congress or courts? 
 
JUSTICE BURGER: “. . . Do you suggest that any of the legislation passed here 
has abrogated the normal equity function of a United States District Judge in 
granting an injunction . . . ?” 
COUNSEL: “Not at all, Your Honor . . . . We do not advocate stripping . . . any 
court . . . of their equitable powers. Indeed . . . we rely on Your Honor’s 
decision in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corporation—that . . . equity courts 
‘have the full panoply of powers required to enforce the laws of Congress.’” 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: “But Hecht against Bowles says you don’t get an 
injunction automatically for a statutory violation!” 
COUNSEL: “That’s correct, Your Honor. And we do not insist on an 
injunction. If petitioner agreed to obey the law voluntarily, as the Hecht 
Corporation did in that case, or as the Mosinee Paper Corporation agreed in 
Your Honor’s [nodding again toward C.J. Burger] case . . .” 
JUSTICE BURGER: “Then you don’t need an injunction . . . . It’s academic.” 
COUNSEL: “And the law would be complied with.” Id. 
 
58 In announcing the outcome orally, Chief Justice Burger declared that “the case 
involves something more important than either a three-inch fish which is endangered as a 
species or even than the one hundred and twenty million dollar [sic] dam. As the majority 
of the Court sees it, some very important and fundamental principles of the separation of 
powers are at stake.” Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, Opinion Announcement, Thursday, 
June 16, 1978, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-
1979/1977/1977_76_1701 [hereinafter TVA v. Hill Opinion Announcement]. 
59 Plater et al., Brief for Appellees, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, No. 76-1701, U.S. 
Sup. Ct., filed Mar. 1, 1978, at 44 (citing Joseph L. Sax, who also happens to be the 
Wallace Stegner Center’s first, and to date most eminent, Stegner Lecturer). 
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of public interests showed a strong necessity for doing so.60 Section 7 mushroomed 
from its 1973 text of 129 words to its present total of 4,603.61 
The conflict between the snail darter and the Tellico Dam was the Section 7 
God Committee’s first assignment.62 For three months a staff of economists 
convened by the Committee prepared an accurate economic analysis of the TVA 
project. Based on the economists’ study, the God Squad unanimously determined 
the dam project, even with 95% of its budget spent, still did not make sufficient 
economic sense to justify spending even the last 5% of its appropriated costs. The 
decision was to save a valley rich in historical, cultural, and ecological values that 
would produce substantial economic benefits for the region.63 
                                                 
60 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)1)(A)(ii) (1988). The Committee is composed of seven 
members: the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and one presidentially appointed representative for each of the states 
affected by the project in question. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3). Section 1536(h) reads in 
pertinent part: 
 
The Committee shall grant an exemption . . . if, by a vote of not less than five of 
its [seven] members voting in person [i.e. the Cabinet officers themselves, no 
delegates]— 
(A) it determines on the record [after a full hearing] that— 
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action; 
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative 
courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, 
and such action is in the public interest; 
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and 
(B) it establishes such reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures, 
including, but not limited to, live propagation, transplantation, and habitat 
acquisition and improvement . . . . 
 
61 16 USC § 1536, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3752 (1978); Pub. L. 
No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226 (1979); Pub. L. No. 97-304, §§ 4(a), 8(b), 96 Stat. 1417, 
1426 (1982); Pub. L. No. 99-659, Title IV, § 411(b), 100 Stat. 3741, 3742 (1986); Pub. L. 
No. 100-707, Title I, § 109(g), 102 Stat. 4709 (1988). 
62 For the God Committee’s first meeting the 1978 amendments coupled the darter 
case with Professor Patrick Parenteau’s whooping crane injunction against Greyrocks Dam. 
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F. 3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994). In the latter case, 
the committee affirmed a negotiated settlement that provided for protections of the crane, 
while allowing the creation of the Greyrocks reservoir. See Endangered Species 
Committee, Transcript of Hearing of Jan. 23, 1979 (on file with author). 
63 See id. Because no detailed study had been prepared of the proposed “Cherokee 
Trail” tourist route up through the valley to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park—
the most promising potential economic element of river-based project alternative 
developments—it was not included in the Committee’s positive economic analysis of non-
dam development.  
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The God Committee’s Tellico Dam verdict was a significant precedent in 
policy terms as well: endangered species protection can encourage constructive 
alternative development planning that actually improves the overall public 
consequences of such projects and programs. The little endangered species, by its 
strategic legal situation in the midst of a contested environmental case, had created 
the only forum practically available for successfully asserting the real public 
interest of this complex matter, in economic as well as ecological and aesthetic 
terms. 
Despite the God Committee’s unanimous economic verdict against the dam, 
however, the media virtually ignored this dramatic reversal of the public’s derisive 
reigning caricature of a small fish blocking a huge and critically needed 
hydroelectric dam. In public opinion the snail darter remained an icon of 
environmental extremism and foolishness, and this permitted anti-regulatory 
political blocs in Washington to engineer an overturning of the Supreme Court and 
God Committee verdicts. 
Late one day, four months after the God Committee’s economic verdict 
upholding the darter and its river, in forty-two seconds in an emptying House 
chamber, TVA’s pro-dam public works allies slipped a rider onto an appropriations 
bill repealing all laws hindering the Tellico Dam, and ordered the reservoir’s 
completion.64 After a half-hearted veto threat by President Carter65 and a last-
                                                 
64 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Those Who Care about Laws and Sausages Shouldn’t 
Watch Them Being Made, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1979, at A23, reprinted in Energy and 
Water Development Appropriations for 1982 -- Part 9: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the 
House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 314–16 (1981). The maneuver 
violated Rule XXI, cl. 2 of the Rules of the House of Representatives which, evidently 
responding to the dangers inherent in allowing appropriations bills to amend substantive 
laws, provides: “Nor shall any provision in any [appropriation] bill or amendment thereto 
changing existing law be in order . . . .” H.R. Doc. No. 403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 525 
(1979) (96th Congress preamble printed over 95th Congress, 2nd Session document). The 
rider did nothing else but amend existing laws, but in order to enforce compliance with 
Rule XXI, a timely point of order had to be made. The House Appropriations Committee 
engineered its move so that none of the few representatives present would understand what 
was being done, so no point of order was made. More complete statements of the 
amendment’s content were inserted in the Congressional Record, but none were actually 
made on the floor when the rider was being considered. Only the first 17 words of the 
amendment (up to “authorized”) were actually made on the floor. Of course, no references 
were made to “Tellico,” “Little Tennessee River,” “endangered species,” “snail darter,” or 
any other phrase that would have given their fellow members notice of the amendment’s 
content. Most students of American government do not know that the Congressional 
Record is not a complete record of congressional debates, and thus is not properly cited as 
an official record. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §5, cl. 3 (journal of each chamber as bare bones 
statement of its proceedings); N. David Bleisch, The Congressional Record and the First 
Amendment: Accuracy Is the Best Policy, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 341 (1985). 
65 Carter’s position with regard to the Tellico controversy exemplified the difficulties 
he experienced with his conciliatory and diplomatic approach to the presidency. Carter 
stated that he hoped his concession in not vetoing the bill would stimulate congressional 
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minute constitutionally-based lawsuit brought by the farmers’ Cherokee Indian 
allies,66 the TVA was ultimately able to finish the dam, close the gates, and flood 
the valley on November 28, 1979. 
Before the river began disappearing beneath the stilled waters of a Tellico 
reservoir, emergency transplants carried whatever snail darters could be salvaged 
to several other Tennessee locations; some of those transplantations appear to be 
working successfully.67 In the following two years, no economic development 
came to the project lands that had been condemned from family farms. 
Embarrassed, TVA proposed to the state that the Tellico lands be developed as a 
major regional toxic waste disposal facility.68 Subsequently, TVA has transferred a 
major portion of the project lands to a housing development corporation affiliated 
with the Walmart Corporation and several other resort developers, and the 
reservoir today is lined with magnificent “McMansions,” golf courses, and marinas 
for wealthy retirees.69 A small industrial park (in the same location as the larger 
industrial development area that had been proposed in the citizens’ alternative 
development plan) has a dozen enterprises with roughly 200 employees.70 Up and 
down the narrow, twisting, shallow reservoir, boaters cruise past the tops of 
farmers’ silos, still poking up forlornly from the greenish water. 
                                                                                                                            
support for benefit-cost control legislation reviewing the economic feasibility of water 
projects. Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 4388 into Law, 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1760 
(Sept. 25, 1979), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31421 
#axzz1nF5GIJxU. Carter’s decision not to veto also reflected his ongoing political battles 
with Congress over the SALT II Treaty, the Department of Education, and Panama Canal 
legislation. Politically, Carter may well have decided that despite the economic merits of 
the case he could ill-afford a tough stance on behalf of a publicly derided two-and-a-half-
inch fish when he needed congressional support on other issues. 
66 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). The citizens’ coalition was 
able to put together a challenge based on the First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), which 
recognized the preexisting constitutional rights violated by federal projects impacting 
sacred lands, including Indian burial grounds. That effort also failed.  
67 Wake of the Snail Darter, supra note 54.  
68 Tipped off by a friend within TVA, the author passed the news to a contact in the 
United Press, and within 24 hours the proposal was abandoned. See Steve Holland, 
Hazardous Waste Dump Proposed for Tellico, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Sept. 29, 1982; 
John Moulton, Tellico Waste Dump Plan Barred, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 
1982, at A1. These articles were published on the same day, with the latter being an 
evening edition story. Note how quickly the toxics plan was shelved in response to pointed 
media coverage, in contradistinction to the passivity and ineffectiveness of media coverage 
of the dam’s demerits. 
69 The farmers who received an average of $330 per acre for their lands, and between 
$5,000 and $12,000 apiece for homes and barns, later saw as their former lots sold for 
$150,000 per half acre and million-dollar homes. 
70 See TELLICO RESERVOIR DEV. AGENCY, TELLICO INDUSTRIES AND PRODUCTS 
(2007). 
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III.  THE ETHICS, FUNCTIONS, AND PRACTICALITIES OF CITIZEN SUITS USING 
ENDANGERED SPECIES AS CANARIES IN THE COAL MINE 
 
In its ultimate resolution, the snail darter-Tellico Dam controversy was, 
depending upon the observer, a protracted waste of time or a frustrating case of 
what-might-have-been. The facts revealed in the God Committee’s dramatic 
eleventh-hour economic analysis, however, reinforce the conclusion that over an 
extended period of 20 years the citizens’ persistent arguments had been correct 
from the start. 
In the words of Charles Schultze of the Council of Economic Advisors, “here 
is a project that is 95% complete, and if one takes just the cost of finishing it 
against the [total project] benefits, and does it properly, it doesn’t pay. Which says 
something about the original design!”71 
The Tellico Dam project was a large, destructive mistake that, despite its 
markedly negative merits, rolled along without hindrance through the official 
corridors of government. 
But was it unethical, hypocritical, for the dam’s citizen opponents to use the 
endangered fish and ESA Section 7 when they fully understood that most members 
of Congress voting for the Act did not intend the statute to be capable of 
obstructing a pork barrel public works project? Did the citizen coalition really care 
about the endangered snail darter, as the Chief Justice doubted, saying it was just 
“a handy handle”?72 
True, for Asa McCall and other farmers it was clearly their homes and farms 
they cared about, not the darter. For trout fishermen, it was the river. For the 
Cherokees, it was saving a sacred cultural place. For the university biologists, it 
was an ecological mandate to preserve natural biota in natural ecosystems. For the 
author and his students, it was a mix of motives, perhaps including an iconoclastic 
wish to oppose official authority that was harming the environment. It is simply 
not realistic to assert that any of the citizens would have mounted such a long and 
painful campaign for the darter if only the fish was at stake. But for many the 
darter became more than a leveraged technicality—it was an embattled piece of 
anciently-evolved creation, a vibrant little symbol of rich and complex natural 
systems being impacted by narrow short-term human agendas, and a metaphor of 
what was happening to flowing rivers, Native American culture, and rural 
communities. As Jimmie Durham, a Cherokee who chaired the International Indian 
Treaty Council, hoping that Chota and the sacred valley would be saved stated, 
“[T]hat fish is . . . a Cherokee fish and I am its brother.”73 
                                                 
71 Charles Schultze, Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers, 
Endangered Species Committee, Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project 25–26 (Jan. 23, 1979) 
(unpublished transcript of public hearing, on file with author) (emphasis added). 
72 See TVA Oral Argument, supra note 15. 
73 Statement of James Durham, Chairman, International Indian Treaty Council (also 
representing National Indian Youth Council), in Hearings on Endangered Species, Serial 
2012] LITTLE FISH CAN BECOME CANARIES 235 
But the fish’s salvation clearly was a means to an end, not by itself a 
determinative motivation. A continuing implication of hypocrisy thus 
understandably dogged the citizens throughout the ESA battle. Although no similar 
criticism is directed at the insider blocs and lobbyists operating in Washington, 
there appears to be a general assumption that public interest citizen advocates 
should have “pure” unmixed motivations, and they appear tainted when other 
personal concerns, albeit non-economic, are implicated. 
Here it may be relevant to utilize the Al Capone analogy: Capone was 
convicted under federal law for income tax evasion,74 not for the murder, 
racketeering, gambling, prostitution, bribery, extortion, and other state crimes he’d 
surely committed, for which, however, owing to widespread corruption in the 
judiciary and constabulary of Chicago, effective state prosecutions were simply not 
possible. 
The darter-dam case quite closely parallels the Capone prosecution. But for 
the opportunistic use, by citizen plaintiffs, of a legal instrument extending beyond 
its legislatively intended scope, the official mechanisms of government would not 
have been able to address the important civic facts. So why was the ESA’s latent 
Section 7, prosecuted by citizen action, arguably necessary in the Tellico Dam 
case? 
The problem was not that the agencies of government beyond TVA didn’t 
know the Tellico Dam’s economic justifications were false. (TVA staffers of 
course clearly knew but it was unrealistic to expect any institution, public or 
private, to self-censor itself when its leadership’s internal drive is strong, or when 
its narrower institutional agendas conflict with the overall public’s larger interest.) 
Beyond TVA, information that this particular project required critical review had 
long existed within government records. The farmers and their allies had 
repeatedly carried economic data to the congressional appropriations committees 
in Washington, including a scathing economic analysis prepared at the University 
of Tennessee in 1971 that also circulated within state government.75 Even the 
Army Corps of Engineers, not known for its aversion to manipulated calculations 
in support of federal pork barrel projects, severely criticized TVA’s benefit claims 
for Tellico Dam.76 But no government agency ever initiated a review of the 
project’s negative merits, and, as the district judge noted, federal courts do review 
a project’s benefit-cost claims when funding has been approved by congressional 
appropriations committees.77 
                                                                                                                            
No. 95-40, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and Environment, of the 
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, at 650–51, June 20, 1978. 
74 See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932).  
75 See PHILLIPS, supra note 31. 
76 See MURCHISON, supra note 22, at 21.  
77 Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 760-61 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev’d, 
549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Despite a number of attempts, 
court challenges to TVA’s condemnations of farmlands—arguments that transfers to a 
private corporation were unconstitutional and that the project’s justifications were arbitrary 
and capricious—all proved likewise ineffective. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater & William Lund 
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Official inertia did not change with discovery of the endangered darter in the 
middle of the dam project. Understandably, TVA did not voluntarily pause and 
reconsider its project when the potential violation surfaced.78 Other federal 
agencies might have intervened, however. Several had conversations with TVA, 
but none attempted to enforce the law against the dam project. Within the 
Department of Interior, three divisions expressed concern about the dam’s 
continuance in the face of the statutory violation—the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. No action 
was initiated by the Department of Interior, nor by the President’s Council on 
Environmental Quality, the federal government’s lead agency charged with 
overseeing and coordinating federal environmental protection efforts.79 Congress, 
for its part, undertook no serious scrutiny of the merits of the darter-dam conflict 
until the Supreme Court prompted the congressional amendments creating of the 
God Committee analysis 19 years after the dam project planning had gotten 
underway.80 Only the courts, pressured by citizens using the ESA’s citizen suit 
provision, could be instigated to take on the issue directly, albeit with limited 
parameters. 
Why would no official forum respond to the substantial issues raised by 
TVA’s dam? Most obviously because there is no existing statute or governmental 
procedure straightforwardly holding public works projects to realistic economic 
projections and benefit-cost accountings from the perspective of the public interest. 
Pigs are likely to fly before Congress passes a “Federal Scrutiny of Dysfunctional 
Uneconomic Federal Projects and Programs Act.” Even after the ESA had created 
a potential forum and opportunity for such public interest scrutiny of the contested 
TVA project, however, even the agencies whose missions were being 
compromised by the project could not move, leaving citizens to carry the burden. 
                                                                                                                            
Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring the “Arbitrary and 
Capricious” Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 661 (1989). 
78 Rather than pausing, the agency accelerated its condemnations, clear cutting, and 
bulldozing, increasing to three shifts a day, working through the night, in an apparent 
attempt to moot the anticipated judicial proceedings. This is the “sunk cost” strategy. See 
NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 43, at 233–35. TVA’s behavior was a major factor 
prompting a subsequent amendment to the ESA. See Jeffrey S. Kopf, Steamrolling Section 
7(d) of the Endangered Species Act: How Sunk Costs Undermine Environmental 
Regulation, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS. L. REV. 393 (1996). 
79 The Department of Interior, however, did step in as amicus curiae to support the 
ESA case when the citizens had carried it to the Supreme Court. See APPENDIX, 
Comments of the Secretary of Interior, Brief of Appellant, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153 (1978) (a copy is on file with the author).  
80 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the accounting office reporting to 
Congress, presented an extremely critical analysis of the Tellico Project in 1977, but it was 
initiated by the deft maneuvers of citizens, not by legislators, and once presented to two 
committee chairmen it was ignored. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COSTS, 
ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS OF THE TELLICO WATER RESOURCES PROJECT (1977), 
available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0902c/102791.pdf.  
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The “Iron Triangle” phenomenon arguably provides the most salient 
explanation why official organs of government found it impossible to bring the 
TVA project to a public accounting, and why ultimately only an indirect, collateral 
statute, wielded by citizen volunteers, could do so. “Iron triangles,” according to a 
standard political science rubric,81 are formed by the alliance between a particular 
industry or economic interest, a governmental agency (or agencies), and a bloc of 
legislators that have an especially strong relationship with that economic sector; all 
three are typically served by a specialized cadre of lobbyists paid by the industry.82 
A typical example is the triangle between the timber industry, the U.S. Forest 
Service that promotes the industry in federal forests as well as being charged with 
regulating it, and Northwest legislators who promote the industry’s interests and 
receive its financial support in campaign and PAC contributions. 
In the water project field, TVA is part of a larger triangle constituting the 
Army Corps, the veteran (and often Southern) legislators chairing the 
appropriations committees, and the bloc of construction, real estate, and other 
economic interests that profit from taxpayer-funded dam and canal projects. 
Each point of an iron triangle looks out for and serves the other two points in 
political and economic terms. The narrowed, focused interests of each of these 
triangles creates a powerful political status quo in their sector of governance, each 
point of the triangle motivated by its own intricate system of rewards. In 
government as well as geometry, triangles are the strongest of all geometric 
shapes. 
Iron triangles also often form interlocked alliances. In the darter saga the 
public works water projects triangle worked closely with the timber, paper, electric 
generating, mining, and ranching triangles, aided by the anti-regulatory U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, the industry-funded Heritage Foundation, and various 
business-oriented “public interest legal foundations.”83 Iron triangle alliances 
                                                 
81 See FRED POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND FUTURE OF OUR MOST 
PRECIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE 286–89 (1982). Recent political science literature has 
increasingly been using the alternative semantic of “interest group networks.” See, e.g., 
Mark Thatcher, The Development of Policy Network Analyses: From Modest Origins to 
Overarching Frameworks, 10 J. THEORETICAL POL. 389 (1998), available at 
http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/10/4/389. To activist public interest participants in capital 
politics, however, the “network” phrase is anodyne, failing to convey the implication of 
entrenched power conveyed by the triangle rubric. 
82 The “iron triangle” term has useful descriptive application in a wide variety of 
special interest settings, some more benign than others. There are iron triangles for mining, 
oil and gas, chemicals, timber, ranching and rangelands, highway construction, pork barrel 
water projects, the defense procurement industry, as well as for education, medicine and 
hospitals, sewage treatment, NASA, and more. Public interest groups aren’t profit-driven 
enterprises; hence they tend to be political outsiders and don’t have iron triangles. 
83 The committee dockets for the darter hearings reflected a plethora of such blocks 
allied against the darter and the ESA. See, e.g., Endangered Species, Part 1: Hearing on 
H.R. 10883 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the H. Comm. 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong. iii-ix (Feb. 15, 1978); Amending the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 2899 Before the Subcomm. on Resource 
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define the established “insiders” in Washington’s political landscape. Their 
dominance in daily governance illustrates what the Tennessee citizens were up 
against, and helps explain why from the start veteran observers prophesied the 
citizens’ attempt to save the fish and its river would inevitably fail. Likewise it 
helps explain how the political process could override the God Committee’s 
economic verdict that had been requested by Congress itself—a unanimous verdict 
against the dam—ignoring it with impunity. 
In this political context, public interest citizen critics are regarded somewhat 
skeptically as marginal outsiders out of step with the rhythms of capital politics, 
unless they can mobilize media coverage, capacity to fund public relations 
campaigns, or other means to rally votes in congressional districts. When they lack 
funds and media support, one of the few ways a citizen group can get systemic 
leverage is by winning an injunction, so the snail darter coalition’s only practicable 
avenue was the courts. To the accusation of hypocrisy for using the darter and 
Section 7, their fundamental retort was that this was the only existing legal avenue 
by which the public values in the river, the farmlands, other valley resources, and 
the fish, could be defended. And in using Section 7 to defend the darter against 
extinction, they were doing precisely what the ESA purported to mandate, 
safeguarding an endangered species’ survival against an existential threat. 
From the beginning, moreover, it was clear that a darter-dam injunction 
would not end the story. The citizens’ meta-strategy focused on the injunction to 
force the political system for the first time to address the challenge to the dam 
seriously on its merits. And that is what occurred—what the darter coalition’s 
mentor Joseph Sax had described as a de facto “remand to the legislature.” In his 
oral announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision, Chief Justice Burger declared 
prophetically, “The matter is now in the hands of Congress . . . . The commitment 
to the separation of powers is too fundamental and too important for us to preempt 
congressional action,”84 and Congress soon thereafter gave us the God Committee. 
Based on the injunction, which was based on an exposure of facts showing threats 
to human welfare as well as to the welfare of the snail darter, the fish had operated 
as a canary in the coal mine. 
It is probably useful to note that, just by their very existence in a place, not all 
endangered species operate as canaries in a coal mine. Many species are assailed 
and become extinct purely through the impact of natural forces and evolutionary 
                                                                                                                            
Protection, S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong. iii-iv (Apr. 13, 1978); 
Endangered Species, Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 10883 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong. iii-
ix (June 20, 1978). For more on the phenomenon of industry-funded “public interest law 
foundations,” see Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L. J. 1415 (1984). 
84 TVA v. Hill Opinion Announcement, supra note 58. Speaking in dissent, Justice 
Powell mourned that “a great reservoir project designed to serve an impoverished area of 
Tennessee is ended,” but noted, “if Congress acts expeditiously, the Court’s decision 
probably will have no lasting adverse consequences. But I have not thought it to be the 
province of this Court to force Congress into otherwise unnecessary action to produce a 
result no one ever intended.” Id.  
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conditions.85 In other cases, where human initiatives threaten a species’ welfare, 
the juxtaposition is just a coincidence. At one point during the darter saga in 
Washington, for example, the Metro subway system was being excavated 
throughout the capital area. At one particular site excavators discovered a colony 
of endangered tiger beetles living at a depth of more than 20 feet underground.86 
The beetles’ status as an endangered species was not demonstrably related to any 
prior human activity, certainly not prior subway excavations, and did not operate 
so as to reveal flaws and dangers posed by the subway system. 
The snail darter’s endangerment in Tennessee, on the other hand, was directly 
attributable to the not-at-all-coincidental fact that most of its historical critical 
habitats had been sequentially destroyed by dams. The fish’s existence in its last 
remaining significant habitat, in the last remaining stretch of the Little Tennessee 
River’s cool, clean flowing waters, thereby served as a direct indicator of the 
severe impending loss of that resource for humans as well.87 In a number of 
situations, the discovery of endangered species in the path of contested 
development projects provides project critics with an opportunity and forum to 
raise serious public interest questions about the projects’ wisdom.88 This role in 
many situations may indeed be salutary, ultimately important in protecting the 
public interest. The role of the endangered canary, however, is especially 
demonstrative and significant where the imminent harms to public welfare 
revealed by the species’ plight are precisely the same harms that have led to the 
species’ endangerment in the first place. 
Coal miners who ignored a canary’s warning were very likely soon to die. 
The modern warnings provided by endangered species, however, have generally 
not achieved the same acknowledgment and responsive reaction.89 In the Tellico 
                                                 
85 George Will, in his piece on Darwin’s birthday, ignores the practical and 
philosophical difference between human and otherwise natural causes of extinction. It’s the 
extraordinary escalation of extinctions caused by human activities over the past century, 
that frames that important discussion. George F. Will, Op-Ed., How Congress Trumps 
Darwin, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2009, at B7. 
86 Interview with Keith Schreiner, Assistant Dir. of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. 
[September 1977]. Puzzled what to do about the beetle, the federal biologists apparently 
just took as many as they could somewhere else, evading the procedures and requirements 
of the ESA. No tiger beetle lawsuit was filed (although one might have been, had the taxi 
companies, trying at that time to halt the mass transit competition, learned of the beetle). 
87 This causal relationship was stressed in the oral argument, albeit without expressly 
invoking the canary, when Justice Powell had asked what the darters’ human use value 
might be. TVA Oral Argument, supra note 15. 
88 See, e.g., Endangered Utah Fish Prompts Controversial Development Plans for 
Provo River, FOX 13 NOW (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:29 PM), http://utahcountysouth.fox13now. 
com/news/news/67543-endangered-utah-fish-prompts-controversial-development-plans-
provo-river. 
89 The first instinct of project proponents when a species conflict is identified (when 
it’s not “shoot—shovel—shut up!”) often is to propose the species’ rapid transplantation to 
someplace else, ignoring the species’ site-specific warning message. In more nuanced 
responses, procedures are invoked to mitigate some species losses and provide regulatory 
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Dam case, the darter’s cautionary message on one hand was dramatically 
successful, leading to the nation’s first intensive economic analysis of an ongoing 
public works water project, with a unanimous decision vindicating the darter, its 
citizen allies, and the rich resources of the river valley on solid economic grounds. 
On the other hand, when the canary warning of an endangered species like the 
darter is proved to be so significantly relevant in identifying the threatened public 
interest in a matter, how can it then be so cavalierly ignored and overridden? 
It was predictable that in the first days of the darter story the initial reaction of 
the media and the public to news of the darter-dam lawsuit would be skeptical and 
humorous. But the citizens bringing the case assumed, wrongly, that as the news 
coverage continued day after day there would be more and more exploration of the 
full story—the darter’s survival in the region’s last remaining major stretch of 
quality flowing river, the dam and reservoir’s small scale, farmers losing their land 
for resale by Boeing and not for a lake, the federal agency’s ludicrously 
manipulated benefit-cost claims, the model city that was a delusion from the start, 
the loss of a nationally significant fishing destination, the valley’s historical 
treasures, the rich alternatives for a tourism route into the Great Smoky Mountains, 
and so on. 
It was not to be. For more than two and a half years the persistent framing of 
the case in the press and in political debates continued to be of a silly little fish 
versus a gigantic hydroelectric dam. Although the darter’s environmental case was 
in the decade’s top three in terms of total media mentions, the coverage was 
superficial, no details. No national investigative reporter ever produced a story 
probing the realities of the case. The simple fact of the court injunction received 
instant broad coverage, from The New York Times to the sardonic news 
commentaries of Ronald Reagan.90 Later, the dramatic revisionist fact of the God 
                                                                                                                            
shields for development projects that implement negotiated habitat protection plans. See 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act—A 
Noah Presumption, and a Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the Coal 
Mine, 27 ENVTL L. 845 (1997). 
90 See, e.g., Warren Weaver, Jr., High Court Bars Dam, Reprieving Rare Fish; But 
Justices Hint Congress Will Act to Permit T.V.A. Project, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1978, at 
A1. Comments on the snail darter by the late President Reagan from his 1976 radio 
program:  
 
For those of you who haven’t heard of or who only dimly remember hearing 
something about the “Snail Darter,” let me offer an explanation. The “Snail 
Darter” is a minnow.  
 
Now that may not be biologically accurate, but to everyone but a biologist a 
tiny fish two or three inches long is a minnow. There are 77 or so varieties of 
Darters with 77 or so names and the differences between them are 
indistinguishable to everyone but a student of Ichthyology. 
 
What makes the Snail Darter unique among its cousins is that it is [on] the 
endangered species list, lives only (so far as we know) in a 17 mile stretch of 
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Committee verdict, revealing the darter’s lawsuit had been anything but 
economically foolish, received little or no coverage.91 
If during those years the American public had been shown the economic 
realities of the darter-dam case—and perhaps most dramatically the unknown story 
of the farmers’ land being condemned so it could be transferred to a Fortune 500 
company for resale—the congressional process would never have dared to override 
the injunction. But because the public image of the darter-dam case never caught 
up with reality, the iron triangle alliance could ignore the God Committee’s 
revisionist verdict and order the completion of the dam and reservoir.92 
Why did the darter’s canary warning, increasingly sharpened over the last six 
years in terms of evidentiary proof and clarity, remain so marginalized and 
unchanged in public perception, a lack of recognition that ultimately allowed the 
merits to be politically ignored and finessed in such fashion? 
In part the failure of public recognition can be attributed to consistent effort 
by the iron triangle alliances to frame and perpetuate the issue in the standard 
cliché terms—environmental extremists, trivial fish, big dam, human progress. 
Many interests in the capital feared the scrutiny that an informed public could turn 
onto a wide variety of uneconomical projects and programs if the lessons of the 
                                                                                                                            
the Little Tennessee River and has held up a $116 million dam for four 
years. It is interesting to note that in this hassle it is a bureaucratic civil 
war—the Environmental Protection Agency versus the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. T.V.A. was building the dam. 
 
The thing that brought the “Snail Darter” (I still say its a minnow) back into the news 
was a recent action by the House Appropriations [Committee]. With an eye toward 
settling the dispute and getting the Tellico Dam completed, the Committee 
appropriated $9 million to transplant the fish, which they estimate number 10,000.  
 
It only takes a little arithmetic to figure out that comes to $900 per fish. 
Think about that the next time you use minnows for bait. 
 
Ronald Reagan, broadcasts of October 18 & 29, 1977; October 18, 1978, quoted in 
Kiron Skinner et al., REAGAN’S PATH TO VICTORY, 214, 231, 367 (2003).  
91 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the 
Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL. L. 1, 16–17 (2002). If 
mentioned, it was portrayed typically in terms that the Committee was continuing the 
anachronism of a little fish blocking a big dam, more silliness. 
92 It was not that the legislators who voted to override all laws blocking dam 
completion did not know the facts. Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus, chairman of the God 
Committee, sent a personal letter to each of 535 Members of Congress detailing the stark 
findings of the Committee they had charged with determining the accurate public interest. 
Id. at 19. The legislative majorities that overrode the injunction and the economic record 
knew the facts, but they also knew that America did not know and so were able to follow 
the usual insider process unhindered. Id. at 19–20. 
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darter were not deflected.93 Industry press materials, think tanks, and other public 
relations efforts repeatedly used the darter cliché in a drum-roll of derisive 
denigration of the Endangered Species Act, and by extension of other 
environmental regulatory programs. 
More surprisingly, the media itself never moved very far beyond the cliché. 
The standard media text was ecology versus economic progress, often with an 
added punditry quip that the little endangered darter was itself endangering the 
political survival of the entire Endangered Species Act.94 Talk radio was 
predictably even more strident and dismissive. 
In part the press’ lack of analysis of the story probably reflected its surface 
complexity and the modern journalist’s need for facts to be easily comprehensible. 
News media are now broadly dominated by business concerns, with a desire to 
capture audience and market share with short, catchy accounts of issues and 
happenings. “My editor won’t let me spend time on this,” one reporter told the 
author. “It’s too complicated, and anyway, we’ve already had several stories on 
environment this month. Indians, too.”95 In a media climate where presidential 
campaign soundbites have declined from roughly 43 seconds in 1968 to just 7.8 
seconds in 2008,96 the degree to which the media’s role as the information supply 
for a democratic people’s participation in government has devolved into market-
based “infotainment” is a matter of substantial concern.97 
There is, moreover, a distressing possibility that much of the public shares a 
further attribute with the press, deflecting attention away from thoughtful inquiry 
into the merits of issues in societal governance. It’s not only that both may seek the 
                                                 
93 See Ward Sinclair, ‘Pork Panic’ Touched Off on Hill, WASH. POST, June 26, 1978, 
at A1. 
94 See, e.g., Drummond Ayres, Controversy Over 3-Inch Fish Stalls the Mighty TVA, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1977, at 31, col. 1. 
95 Telephone interview with Aram Boyagian, ABC News, probably July 1979. 
96 See Craig Fehrman, The Incredible Shrinking Sound Bite, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 2, 
2011), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/01/02/the_incredible_ 
shrinking_sound_bite/; Average Length of Presidential Candidate Soundbites on Network 
Evening News, CTR. FOR MEDIA AND PUB. AFF., available at http://www.campaign 
legalcenter.org/attachments/MEDIA_POLICY_PROGRAM/1126.pdf (last visited June 29, 
2012); The Incredible Shrinking Sound Bite, NPR MORNING ADDITION (Jan. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/05/132671410/Congressional-Sound-Bites (last 
visited June 29, 2012). 
97 “A popular government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, 
is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance: and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the 
power which knowledge gives . . . .” Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 
1822), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html; “I 
know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; 
and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion . . . .” Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (1820), available at http://tcfir.org/opinion 
/Thomas%20Jefferson%20on%20Educating%20the%20People.pdf. 
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comfort of soundbite wisdom in a complicated and confusing world, or that both 
seem to distrust science and thoughtful intellectual inquiry.98 Even more bemusing 
is the possibility that substantial fractions of the populace display a marked 
resistance to changing their minds once having taken a position. Of course neither 
journalists nor citizens generally enjoy eating crow, having to acknowledge 
mistakes or, worse, admitting they’ve been gulled by manipulated information. 
Once a view of a matter is framed and accepted as true, recent data indicates there 
is a deep inherent reluctance in many of us to change a position even when 
presented with clear evidence that it is false.99 In several experiments, in fact, 
researchers at the University of Michigan found that “when misinformed people, 
particularly political partisans, were exposed to corrected facts in news stories, 
they rarely changed their minds. In fact, they often became even more strongly set 
in their beliefs. Facts, they found, were not curing misinformation. Like an 
underpowered antibiotic, facts could actually make misinformation even 
stronger.”100 It apparently is extremely psychologically threatening to many of us 
to have to admit we are wrong. 
This aversion to thoughtful revision may indeed have had a bearing upon the 
fate of the snail darter and its canary message to America. In subsequent years, in 
myriad conversations with non-environmentalist citizens who remember the snail 
darter controversy, the spontaneous reaction at the mention of the fish that halted 
the dam is usually derisive laughter. Offered information demonstrating the darter 
case’s economic common sense—including data from the Government 
Accountability Office and TVA itself—most dismiss the thought with a knowing 
smile and skeptical shake of the head. That is understandable. In the three years of 
heavy national coverage of the fish story, how many thousands, even millions of 
citizens had scoffed at the snail darter? How many conversations at water coolers, 
dinner tables, in talk radio shows and bars around the country, had archly derided 
the foolishness of the darter and its extremist eco-defenders? To reverse such a 
fixed presumed reality is too disturbing, too internally ego-bruising. 
And so the darter remains a misbegotten icon, used by contemporary critics 
like Hannity, Beck, and Limbaugh to assail the federal government and 
                                                 
98 James Joyner, More Americans Believe in Angels than Global Warming, OUTSIDE 
THE BELTWAY (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/more_americans_ 
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100 Id. 
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environmental protection laws when in truth it could prove the contrary 
proposition: that good ecology can indeed make good economics. The canary tells 
us so. 
In the future perhaps the media, the American populace, and, trailing them, 
Congress, will come to recognize that thoughtful inquiry, probing analysis, 
comprehensive and balanced decision-making, all are essentially important to a 
society’s long-run sustainable welfare. Would the snail darter story today still end 
in the same canted outcome? Probably. But perhaps the blogosphere, currently an 
undisciplined cacophony of uncertain facts, random thoughts, and dubious 
analysis, can eventually seize upon the opportunities offered by instant global 
information transfer to remake the way governments and their people recognize 
and process the mass of information that will always be critical to societal 
wellbeing. 
Viewed through the retrospective lens of history, the saga of the snail darter 
provides one more example of a bemusing modern truism: Scratch away at the 
surface of almost any environmental controversy, and pretty soon you’re looking 
deep into fundamental questions of democracy. 
